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INTRODUCTION

The Bernard Madoff story, apparently the biggest investment scam in
U.S. history, is fascinating non-fiction. As I write this Essay Gust nine
months since the scandal broke), there is no authoritative account yet, and
there may never be. Journalists and authors have tried to make some sense
of what happened, but with so little known for sure about the basic pia l
elements-the who, how, and why- interpretations still go in many different directions. The scandal is a massive human and finan cial tragedy, and
as with all tragedies, the impulse is to find a causal story with sharply defin ed heroes and villains and a familiar narrative arc of temptation. hubris,
and sin. followed by punishment. MadofThas confessed and been sentenced
to jail for the rest of his life, but thus far revealed little. Hence the focu s of
sense-making has shifted for the time being to his fami ly and business associates as possible co-conspirators, or at least enablers, along with the predictable wrangling about how much blame the victims deserve because of
their extraordinary trust in Madoff and lack of skeptical diligence. The
common readings run from the simplistic to tbe truly disturbing.1
..
Thomas Aqu inas Reynolds Professor o f Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Man McGrath for his research help with this Essay.
I. The "Jcwishness" of th e fraud has been the subject of ample popular chatte r,
much of it distressingly anti-Semitic. Books that have already been rushed into print include
ERIN ARVEDLUND, Too GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE RJSE AND FALL OF BERNIE MAOOn' (2009)
(the most favorabl y reviewed) and JEltRY OPPENHEIM ER, MAooFF WlTIf THE MONEY (2009)
(with th e most predictable tide). Perhaps th e most intriguingjoumalistic coverage of Madoff
thus far has been a series of articles in Vanity Fair magazine. See, e.g., Mark Seal, MadojJ's
World, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2009, al 124.
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My specific subject here is the hero-villain back story involving Hany
Markopolos and the SEC. Markopolos was the Boston-based financial analyst who early on came to the accurate conclusion that Madaff was probably
running a Ponzi scheme. and starting around 1999 tried to convince the SEC
to expose it. Although he was neither the first nor the only whistleblower,
his efforts were the most detailed and persistent? The SEC staff did undertake a number of inspections and investigations, but never found the truth.
Their main efforts were to look into the possibility of unlawful frontrunning, not the underlying legitimacy of Madoffs advisory operations.
Hence the Commission missed what seems to be a relatively easy opportunity to mitigate, ifoot prevent, the tragic investor losses that later occurred. l
The intriguing question, of course, is why the SEC failed to detect
Madofrs fraud once it was so well laid out in front of them. In this Essay, I
examine three attempts at sense-making that seek to answer the question by
characterizing the behavior of the staff members involved. 4 Two of these
came early. In January, 2009, a lengthy op-ed piece wriUen by Michael
Lewis and David Einhorn appeared in the Sunday edition of the New York
Times, entitled "The End of the Financial World as We Know It."s Lewis is
a well-known author (Liar's Poker, Moneybalf) and former Wan Street
trader; Einhorn runs a well-known hedge fund. Taking on not just the Madoff scandal but a broader set of SEC failures, they amplified the criticism
and alleged an insidious form of conuption inherent in the SEC's culture,
whereby what happens inside the agency is largely driven by the desire of
top officials to cultivate lucrative job opportunities on Wall Street when
they leave.' The SEC had no motivation to expose Madoff, they said. 1 Rejecting the idea that the problem lay simply with the particular staff members involved in the fiasco, they argue that a
2. According to the Office of Inspector General Report, discussed infra, there were
at least six substantive complaints raising serious concerns about the possibility of a Ponzi
scheme. SEC, OffiCE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF TIlE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MAooFF'S PoNZI SCHEME, REPORT No. 01G-509 (2009),
http://www.sec.gov/newslstudiesl2009/o ig-S09.pdf[hereinafter OIG REPORT). By the lime
of Markopolos' most detailed presentation in 2005, the SEC had already conducted two
examinations of its own. An enforcement investigation was commenced (largely at the urging of the Boston District Office) but produced nothing.
3. For a discussion of many of the warning signs, see Greg N. Gregoriou & Francois-Serge Lhabitant, MadotT: A Riot of Red Flags (Dec. 31, 2(08) (unpublished manuscript,
available a/ http://www.ssm.comlabstract= 133 5639).
4. For another perspective on the SEC's failures in the last few years, including
Madoff, see generally Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulalion,3 BROOK. 1. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 289 (2009).
5. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, The End 0/ the Financial World as We
Know II, NY. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK.9.

6.

/d.

1.

Id.
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new director of risk assessment was no more likely to grasp the risk of Bernard
MadofT than the old director of risk assessment because the new guy's thoughts
and beliefs were guided by the same incentives: the need to cuny favor with the
politically influential and the desire to keep sweet the Wall Street elite.i

Facetiously or not, they called for Harry Markopolos to be put i.n charge of
SEC enforcement.9
Then, in early February, Markopolos himself testified before Congress
and submitted a lengthy narrative that contains both his version ofthe effort
to alert the SEC and his diagnosis of what went wrong. IO Not surprisingly,
this story is also harshly critical-he's the hero and certain people at the
SEC (and the SEC's own internal culture) were his antagonists, mainly via
gross incompetence. He portrays them as somewhat pathetic.
Critical stories like these fed a belief that soon, in some circles, became a political cry in the midst of the financial crisis. A handful of conservatives made the claim that investor protection under the SEC was worse
than having no investor protection at all, because the SEC was simply fostering the illusion of genuine regulatory effort-its own version of a con
game. 11 More moderate voices didn't go that far, but were convinced that
the SEC was a severely troubled institution in need of massive refonn.12
Responding to all this, the SEC's Inspector General (a relatively independent office within the agency) was instructed to investigate the "what
happened" question and report publicly, which it did at the end of August
2009 1l-tbe third narrative subject of this Essay. This document is more
recitation than analysis. but interesting reading nonetheless. We discover
that the staff had leads from a number of sources besides Markopolos, and
actually undertook three examinations of Madoff and two enforcement investigations in response. Amidst the lengthy detail, it contains tragic-comic
anecdotes of how the staff repeatedly came so close to breaking the case,
but always stopped short for no good reason. Incredibly, some of those staff
8. Id. The reference to the director of risk assessment apparently refers to a conversation that Markopolos reported having with that staff member very late in h is efforts 10
expose Madoff(early 2(08), which led 10 a promise of follow-up but then silence.
9. Id.
10. Assessing the Madoff Pami Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., Illth Cong. (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos, Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Fraud E:o:.:aminer) [hereinafter Markopolos Testimony).
II. See, e.g., Assessing the Madoff Pal1Zi Scheme and the Need for Regulatory
Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., Illth Cong. (2009) (statement
of Rep. Ron Paul) ("[AJllthey do is give a false sense of security."); Robert P. Murphy, The
SEC Makes Wall Street More Fraudulent, M1SES DAILY, Jan. 5, 2009,
hnp:llmises.org/slory/3273.
12. See, e.g., Arthur Levin Jr., Haw the SEC Can Prevent More Madoffi. WAll ST.
J., Jan. 5, 2009, at AI3 (scandal is occasion for "fundamental reform" at SEC).
13. See 010 R£PORT, supra note 2.
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members received promotions or commendations for their work on the cases. Not surprisingly. it avoids assigning blame to the SEC's commissioners
or senior executive staff: it is largely about bumbling from below.
Each of these narratives has some sort of dramatic effect, but effective
narratives are not always accurate ones. The closer one gets to what passes
for reality, the more ambiguity there usually is. The Lewis-Einhorn story
echoes the conventional "capture" theories of regulation. 14 Markopolos's
and the Inspector General's accounts are more banal and mundane, if no
less disturbing. The OIG Report carefully resists supporting any capture
theory, but avoids thinking hard about the obvious questions about why the
SEC got to the point where such incompetence could flourish except for
predictable expressions of concern about lack of financial training for the
staff and poor inter-office communication.
None of these three narratives quite tells the story that I infer from
what apparently happened. To be sure, I make no claim of inside knowledge. But the first two accounts strike me as too simple. if not simplistic,
and the (nspector General's account leaves too much unsaid. So here. I
want to draw a different, more sympathetic characterization. My account is
more deeply about the set of forces that constrain administrative agencies
like the SEC. In tenns of character development in the storytelling. mine is
less susceptible to stark hero-villain portrayals. There is an important difference here that speaks to regulatory capacitylS-the capture accounts are
more dispositional, while mine is more situational. In the end, I am more
open to the possibility of an improved regulatory regime. though far from
optimistic. 16

I. THE SEC's INITIAL EXCUSE: RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

Before we tum to the Markopolos and Lewis-Einhorn stories, we
should consider the SEC's initial excuse (offered before its Inspector General began his investigation into what happened, and thus preliminary}that a severe lack of resources explains most of the SEC's problems. The
Commission has repeatedly pointed out that its regulatory task is immense,
and that budgetary growth has Dot kept up with either the scope or complexity of the modem financial markets. The figures commonly set forth are the
numbers of regulated entities: some 12,000 public companies; 5,500 broker14. See. e.g., Susan E. Woodward, Regula/ory Capture a/ the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, in RESTRUcnJRING REGUlATION AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 99
(James R. Banh el al. eds., 2000).

IS. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION ANDPUBUC INTERESTS: THE POSStBlUTYOF
2 (2008).
16. See Donald C. Langevoon, The SEC. Retail Investors. and the Institutionaliza-

GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT

tion ofthe Securities Markets, 9S VA. L. REv. 1025, IOS5 (2009).
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dealer finns; 4,600 mutual funds; and 11 ,300 registered investment advisers.17 This by an agency with roughly 3,500 employees 'S and a budget of
under $1 billion,'9 though supplemented by self-regulatory authorities, like
FfNRA, and other allies.
By and large, critics have dismissed this defense, which--like most
claims based on statistics-lacks dramatic force. To embellish the narrative, let me try the following. Imagine that you were brought to the top of a
high mountain by a heavenly authority and asked to be in charge of securities regulation in the United States. You look out and see the array ofregulatory subjects, a census of which goes well beyond those just described.
Take out your telescope and notice, for example, that just one out of the
12,000 public companies is General Electric, which just by itself is of extraordinary complexity and opacity-a collective of thousands of officers,
directors, employees, and affiliates. 20 Imagine how much time and attention
it would take to fully comprehend GE's business, operations, and financial
condition. And once you are finished, there are 11,999 or so more. The
5,500 brokerage finns morph into some 670,000 stockbrokers, with some
108 million customer accounts, and include behemoths like Merrill Lynch
and Goldman Sachs. We haven't even noticed the hedge funds, or the accounting profession. And through your telescope you also notice thousands
of unregistered figures scurrying back and forth , perhaps up to something
suspicious. And just as you begin to comprehend the immensity of what is
before you, the heavenly authority mentions that the world you are looking
at, way out in the far distance, has soft and permeable borders: foreign activity that easily tunnels into your world, as well as creatures from the domestic domains of banking, commodities, and insurance who pop in and
out, often as undocumented aliens.
Now you're asked how much in the way of resources you would need
to monitor and police this world well, fully aware of the immense profits
that come to the cheaters within. Of course you'll want to think through the
non-legal institutions (reputation, investor diligence) that constrain opportunism, as well as leveraging strategies that you might employ like enlisting
accountants, lawyers, and bankers as gatekeepers. But especially if you are
doing this in 2009, these market-based constraints seem a little less potent
17. See Issues Raised by the Bernard L MadaJ[ Investment Securities Maller: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Illth Congo 12 (2009) (statement
of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforeement, SEq, available at
http://banking.scnalc.gov/public/ filcs/ThomscnSECTeslimooyI2709.pdf.
18. Id.
19. For fiscal year 2009, see SEC, PUrriNG INVESTORS FIRST: 2009 PERfORMANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
IS
(2009),
available
al
http://www.sec.gov/abouvsecpar/secpar2oo9.pdffl2009review.
20. See SEC v. Gen. Elec. Co., Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. 3029, Litig. Release No. 21166, 2009 WL 2398241 (Aug. 4, 2009).
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tban they did a few years ago. 1 have no idea how much I would bargain for
to take the job, but I can't imagine that it's around 3,500 people (only a portion of whom are lawyers, accountants, or economists) and a billion dollar
budget. Any remotely realistic figure would probably start at many times
greater than this.
I find this a fairly dramatic and telling exercise, but the SEC reduces it
to a set of boring numbers, and sounds a bit whiney in the process. Why the

caution? Two reasons are important. First, the SEC undermines its own
authority and self-image by suggesting that it is far short of being able to do
its job properly-it has always sought to project confidence to investors.
The message is we need more to do our job better, but never a cry of poverty. Second, the budgetary constraint is Congress's choice, and one of the
important unwritten rules of being a successful sitting regulator in an independent regulatory agency is never to blame Congress for your problems,
even when Congress is very much to blame.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

In the public chatter and news reports surrounding the Madoff scandal,
there were plenty of suggestions of conflicts of interest, such as Madotrs
personal ties to regulators like chainnan Arthur Levitt,~l as well as lowerlevel connections such as the fact that Madoers niece married a fonner SEC
attorney who-prior to the relationship, it appears- had supervisory authority in the area in which MadotT operated. 12 To this point, however, there has
been no credible evidence that anyone at the SEC deliberately protected
Madoff. This was almost surely a sin of omission, not commission.21
As noted above, Lewis and Einhorn make a different point that the
SEC's sins came from being Wall Street's willing enablers, with the dominating motivation being senior officials' desire to preserve lucrative job
opportunities at major banks and investment finns when they leave public
service. "If you work for the enforcement division of the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, tbat if you maintain
good relations with Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by it. "24 I suspect there is truth to the idea that an ambitious regulator would not want to alienate completely a future employer in
tbe industry. There are now some empirical studies that document the

21. Madoff was a former board chairman of Nasdaq and served on the SEC's Advisory Committee on Market Dala in 2000-01 (of which I was also a member).
22. See Elizabeth Williamson, Shana Madoffs Ties (0 Uncle Probed: WeI/Regarded Industry Figure Called "Devastaled and Distraught ", WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2008,
a1C3.
23. The OIG report so concludes. See OIG REPORT, supra note 2.
24. Lewis & Einhorn, supra nOle 5.
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SEC's inclination to go easy on big Wall Street players in enforcement cases. 2S But for a variety of reasons, I'm skeptical of precisely how far this
argument can be taken. With respect to lawyers in particular, there may be
some value in having been friendly to the finn (or its cohorts) in the past,
but once the regulator leaves, most of the bargaining power disappears. A
more fruitful strategy, as I have argued elsewhere/6 is to be a tough regulator and then exploit the specialized knowledge that comes from being involved in designing or implementing those regulations, coupled with access
to the agency officials who remain behind. One could go fairly far in upsetting segments of the industry and still bring value to the future employment
relationship. There are limits to this, of course: no doubt the savvy regulator understands the desirability of keeping Wall Street a vibrant, profitable,
deal-generating place.
But even to this extent, how well would it explain Madoff? The disconnect in the Lewis-Einhorn story, surprisingly, is that they treat "Wall
Street" as monolithic, an assembly of the economic gods that is either angry
or pleased by what the regulators do. In fact, within the investment community there are nasty rivalries and dramatically differing interests, with
some segments liking nothing more than aggressive regulation that hurts
their competitors or counterparties more than themselves. The most potent
force toward hedge fund regulation is the registered mutual fund community; broker-dealers and investment advisers have heated feuds. Madoff, for
example, had many enemy rivals in the trading business who would have
loved to see him disappear as an economic force. Put simply, I can't imagine that the future careers of anyone at the SEC would have been hurt by
exposing him as a fraud. Quite the contrary, I suspect.
That said, I think the more general point made by Lewis and Einhorn
is right- the SEC takes on Wall Street far less aggressively than it should,
especially the big investment banks. But I would put the revolving-door
explanation down somewhat on the list of reasons, and promote two others.
One has to do with potent political influence from Congress and the White
House, which we shall tum to shortly. The other takes us back to resources.
One of the SEC's lesser-known soft spots is its tendency to settle almost all its cases, which necessarily means that it leaves something of value
on tbe negotiating table for the other side to keep. It can't afford to litigate
25. See Eric W. Zitzewitz, Prosecutoriai Discretion in Mutual Fund Settlement
Negotiations. 2003-7, 9 D.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'y, Aug. II, 2009, available at
bnp:llwww.bpress.comibejeap/voI9/issl/art24 (comparing penalties el(lractcd by the SEC 10
the New York Attorney General's office); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from En/orcement Against Broker-Dealers (Aug. II , 2009), available al
http://www.ssm .com/abstracFI333717.
26. See Donald C. Langevoon, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face a/Uncertainly, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1604, 1621 (2006).
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more than a tiny fraction of its cases. When what is targeted is a profitable
bit of Wall Street opportunism, any effort to examine, understand, and respond to the phenomenon will involve a war of resources that the Commission is destined to lose unless it is willing to pull people from other needy
investigations and projects and concentrate its forces. That is unappealing
for many obvious reasons, and so simply on a cost-benefit calculus, we see
many more skirmishes than wars, and more ambiguous armistices than victories or defeats. There just aren't enough assets to deploy.
This deprivation, I suspect, is so long-standing and pervasive that the
internal SEC culture has adjusted to it, which has deep psychological effects. People cannot keep up morale if simply dwelling on the frustrations
of the given task before them and the inadequacy of their resources. That is
threatening to the staffs self-image, so, beliefs shift. The internal focus
becomes on what is done, rather than what is ignored. Inside the SEC, one
finds smart people who, by and large, work very hard with a high level of
craftsmanship. They go to work on smaller, more manageable cases,27
hopefully with an attention-grabbing angle-many kinds of insider trading
cases are particularly well suited for this. With people working hard on
what they are doing and generating tangible results in the fooos of large
numbers of settlements, the anxiety diminishes. A year in which there is a
twelve-percent increase in successfully closed cases becomes cause for celebration (and a round of merit pay awards), with no one really noticing
anymore how woefully low the baseline figure was in the first place.
Once the culture adjusts in this way, there is no real incentive to look
for big, difficult cases, with high levels of uncertainty and a massive drain
on resources. That means an aversion to the more deeply disguised foons
of manipulation and opportunism practiced at the higher levels in the securities business, unless evidence conveniently emerges from other sources, like
the financial press or other regulators. This is not deliberate or even conscious aversion, but rather construal of situations in a way that makes it
more likely that attention and resources tum to some more immediately
manageable, productive task. It is human (and organizational) nature. And
even the metrics become constraining. Once there is a need to have yearby-year increases in the number of cases opened, brought, and settled, the
incentive to find smaller, more manageable cases becomes stronger, as does
the aversion to the daunting and the costly. No one wants the SEC's
equivalent of Vietnam or the Middle East wars-discouragingly massive
and cosily efforts that produce no readily definable victory.
In tum, this mindset also produces excessive sensitivity to the risk of
failure. Though the feeling of inadequacy is masked by all the hard work
27.
N.Y.

See loe Nocera, SEC. Chased Small Fry While Big Fish, Madaff. Swam Free,

TIMEs, lune 27, 2009, at BI.
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and celebration of the many small victories it declares, it reveals itself in the
hesitancy to bring cases to court that could embarrass the Commission-and
the responsible staff-with a notable loss . That feeds botb the aversion to
cases whether tbe other side has the talent and resources to overwhelm the
staff, and the culture of settling to avoid litigation risk. The fear is not of
facing the consequences of winning against a powerful target, but of wasted
effort and reputational damages from not being able to succeed.
Does this give us any better glimpse into the failure to expose Bernie
Madoff? Imagine that you were an SEC enforcement official, confronted
with the claim that Madoff must either be front-running or operating a PODzi
scheme in order to generate the steady profits that he was assuring his
clients they were earning. The first reaction, of course, is that the latter
seems highly unlikely-Ponzi schemes have naturally limited durations
(you always eventually run out of gullible investors), so that an exit strategy
is an absolute necessity. Madoff was so deeply tied to the Wall Street
world- in terms of business, family, and personal wealth and commitments-that he would have no way out. Moreover, his clients were wealthy, sophisticated investors who were well positioned 10 do their own due
diligence, making him vulnerable to a run if word spread that he was not to
be trusted. There is no rational explanation for why, having built such a
successful and apparently legitimate trading firm, he would ever take such a
risk?B
Without smoking-gun type evidence, this is hardly an appealing investigation to pursue. It would probably be a very costly war to wage and if
your instinct is right that the likelihood of finding fraud is very 10"Y. the
risks are great. Finding nothing of substance will have embarrassed and
angered a powerful Wall Street figure and drained considerable resources in
the process. Assume further that your investigators are already stretched
thin working hard on other matters,29 and it becomes easy to put this one off.
To assuage concern, you might have someone take a quick (maybe cursory)
look at the front-running possibility, and when that turns up nothing, feel
better about letting the matter drop.
The Inspector General's report shows precisely this kind of thinking
among various mid-level staffers in New York and Washington who had a
chance at the Madoff matter. One "so sad it's almost funny" discovery was
that the home office-based examination team looking into Madoff concentrated on front-running rather thaD the Ponzi scheme possibility because
28. And if for some strange reason he did, it would probably be deeply hidden in
fabricated books and records and the like that would take eXlTaordinary effort to uncover.
But it 's still hard to imagine.
29. The OIG Report notes that tbe examiners who were working on the Madoff
matter were ordered to focus instead on the mutual fund ITading scandals that had just been
publicized. OIG REPORT,supra note 2. al 3 1.
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front-running was the team's special "area of expertise"lO-very close to the
classic economists' joke about the drunk who looks for his lost car keys
under the lamp post because that's where the light is the best. Ultimately,
the key to breaking open the Ponzi scheme was to have sought verification
via data in the possession of market counterparties, clearing agencies, etc.,
that the vast amount of options trading that would have been necessary for
the split-strike strategy was in fact occurring-in the face of concerns, expressed by Markopolos and others, that there was no evidence of it in the
usual market places. Though occasionally planned, it was never done,
largely-it seems-because there was no one with the time to sift through
the data dump that would have resulted. Lacking evidence, the staff was
afraid. The report recounts a conversation where a senior level examiner
reminded the others that Madoff was "a very well·connected, powerful person," suggesting that the staff would have to have more substantial evidence
of wrongdoing in hand before pushing him hard?'
If something like that is indeed what happened, it is a very different
story than one in which SEC enforcement people look the other way from
evidence of misbehavior just "to keep sweet the Wall Street eJite,"J2 in
hopes of sharing in the lucre after their departures--even if the tragic consequence is the same. The narrative loses some of its sharpness and critical
bite; the portrayal of the SEC as a character shifts from villain to an institution simply lacking the capacity to become heroic, at least in this particular
instance.
III. IGNORANCE AND INDIFFERENCE

Harry Markopolos's narrative is very different from that told by Lewis
and Einhorn. It is a "bottom up" story of how he tried to convince the SEC
of Madoff's fraud and the discouraging things he learned about the Commission's staff in the process. Its conclusion is more about ignorance and
sloth than conflicts of interest, although he too worries some about external
political pressures.
The story begins wben Markopolos is asked to develop an inveshnent
product to compete with MadoW s. Doing some reverse engineering, he
tries to determine how Madoff generates the low-risk, steadily healthy re·
turns that he says he delivers to his clients every month and concludes that it
is mathematically impossible using the kind of "split-strike" conversion
strategy described in the promotional materials. Convinced that there must
be fraud involved, Markopolos goes to the SEC's Boston District Office
30. [d. at 30. Similarly, the New York examination staff avoided looking at portfolio issues because that was "not [their] strength." !d. al 32.
31. [d. at 199, 387 (quolingOstrow Test. Tr. 113- 14; Lamore Test. Tt. 245-46).
32. See lewis & Einhorn, supra nole 5. See a!sa notes 5-8 and accompanying telll.
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(BDO), where he is first rebuffed. But eventually, he finds a financial ana·
Iyst on the staff who, he says, understands and agrees an investigation ought
be launched. Others in the BOO seem to concur. However, that office does
not have jurisdiction over Madoff- the Northeast Regional Office (NERO),
based in New York, does. In his version, he is left to start anew at the
NERO fairly much on his own, which he does in 2005. There he hits what
appears to be a brick wall, mainly in the person of Meaghan Cheung, a
branch chief, who seems to show no interest in what he is saying. To Markopoios, this is mainly because Cheung lacked the basic financial and
mathematical knowledge to understand him or the problem. She just didn't
get it.
There probably is more color to the encounter than that. To say the
least, Markopolos comes across as a strange protagonist even in his own
narrative. He fills his account with repeated references to his background in
military intelligence, fear for his life, and the need for hyper-security in the
dangerous mission his group had undertaken.]) His interpersonal skills
don't seem to be the greatest. He makes plain to Cheung that he thinks she
and everyone else at the SEC are lacking in the financial sophistication to
crack this case. Thus they need him-Markopolos-as a key player on the
investigatory team.l4 When told that the staff has PhD economists they
could consult instead, he remarks that they can't be worth anything because
the Commission doesn't pay enough to attract the truly qualified. Jj This is
not how to win friends and influence people.
I suspect (and the Inspector General's report concurs) that Cheung
quickly made the judgment that Markopolos was obnoxious and selfabsorbed, deep into his own personal crusade against Bernie Madoff, which
caused her not to pay as much attention to the underlying argument as she
should have. The SEC gets tens of thousands of purported whistle-blower
"tips" each year, and many are from people whose motives are not very
public-spirited. Tips from competitors are particularly problematic. Here, I
suspect that she may have started employing the heuristics mentioned earlier: Madoff would have to be crazy to pull a stunt like this given his deep
ties to both Wall Street and Washington, and his sophisticated clientele
were not the type to easily be fooled by a big lie. She was horribly wrong,
of course, but I suspect that many of us would have had the same reaction.
33. Markopolos Testimony, supra note 10, at 1,3,4,25,49.
34. Id. at 17 ("When I mentioned that my derivatives expertise would be needed to
break the case open, she dismissed me . . .. In my experience, once a case is turned into the
SEC, the SEC claims ownersbip of it and will no longer involve the investigator. The SEC
never called me.").
35. /d. at 16 (telling Cheung that "a lJUe derivatives expert couldn't afford to work
for SEC pay''). According to the 010 report, the staff did at one point seek the aid of the
SEC's economists, but did not get useful belp. 010 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
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I'm sure it affected the depth and vigor of the investigation that was later
undertaken by the NERO.
Shed of the personal obsession, Markopolos's story comes across as
fairly mundane: he sees Cheung and the others as petty bureaucrats-not up
to the challenges of their regulatory domain, more bumbling than villainous.
What's more, her task had its own obstacles. Unbeknownst to Markopolos,
two SEC examination staffs had investigated Madaff during the prior two
years-though not well, obviously-and the New York-based team lobbied
against any effort to reopen the case and risk being proven wrong. J6 And
the junior staff member working for Cheung on the case was relatively new
to the Commission, just a year and a half out of law school, and completely
new to broker-dealer matters.
Markopolos's diagnosis calls mostly for a thorough housecleaning.
Use fewer lawyers, and hire investigators with financial training and industry experience instead. Promote greater continuing financial education. Put
in place bonus plans tied to the amount of fines collected by the branch or
office involved. Focus on enforcing ethical principles, not legal rules. (Further on he says that if this proves impossible, the federal government should
simply delegate its securities enforcement work to the New York Attorney
General's Office and the Massachusetts Securities Division.J7)
This Essay is not about regulatory refonn, and so this is not the place
to go into the merits of these particular proposals. I do agree fully with his
criticism of excessive reliance on lawyers at the SEC and the need to introduce far greater financial sophistication into the agency's thinking and training. In many ways, the SEC needs to turn itself into a "Financial Intelligence Agency" that uses more effective "on the ground" surveillance tools
to understand and monitor emerging risks to investors in the financial markets and securities industry.
In fact, all this seems so obvious that the only interesting point is why
it didn't happen long ago. Go back to the mountaintop I described earlier
and consider what resources you'd bargain for before agreeing to oversee
the world of securities. Just a little thought would lead you to demand dedicated, sophisticated surveillance personnel, both for investigations and regulatory policy. Continuing education-with strong connections to business
schools and economics programs, not just law schools and the legal profession-would be apriority, too.
Their absence, I suspect, is mainly just another manifestation of the
relative poverty of the SEC. To be sure, the lawyer domination ofthe agency has led to an excessive marginalization of economics and finance at

36. See OIG REPORT,supra note 2, at 257 (describing the cultural issue of examiners
trying to discourage any reopening of matters that might cast doubt on their competence).
37. Maricopa/os Teslimany, supra nole 10, aI49-50.
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times, and that hegemony is self-replicating. Professional managerial skills
are in short supply. But even tbat is in an environment of competition for
scarce resources-in a world of plenty, even lawyers would be happy to
spend money having their subordinates learn more finance and hiring
skilled expert assistance for tbe more technical, challenging tasks. And so
we are back to a question that gets relatively little attention from Markopolos, Lewis and Einhorn, or the Inspector General: what explains that historic
poverty?
IV. POLITICAL WILL

The portrayals of the SEC as either utterly conflicted or c1uelessly inept are overdrawn. Much of the work the SEC actually does in the enforcement and inspection area is done competently. The failwes are largely
in what is ignored or missed, like Madoff, and the relative poverty of the
agency in light of its assigned mission-and the protective culture tbat has
emerged inside the agency to blunt the frustrating reality- are better explanations, but lack narrative spark.
What is left is to ask why the impoverishment persists. As has long
been pointed out, the SEC takes in more in fees imposed on various securities-related activity than it costs to operate the agency, and the fees are very
low. Congress could easily increase the agency's budget simply by increasing the fees. The SEC also produces large sums via civil penalties and disgorgement, none of which it keeps.
Of course, the SEC is hardly the only budgetary priority for tbe nation,
and any sums collected in fees and penalties that are redirected to the SEC
are sums that can no longer support other important programs. The budgetary issue and SEC self-funding are complex and difficult issues. Nor can
we assume that a major budgetary increase would be entirely well spent.
The SEC is a bureaucracy witb fairly weak internal incentives, and it would
take strong, sophisticated leadership to cause new resources to fill the most
pressing gaps efficiently, rather than support old habits of avoidance. Overregulation is also an inevitable risk.
That points to one possibility, that under-funding was pan of a more
pervasive belief in the power of markets to cleanse themselves, and of nonlegal forces like reputation, competition, and learning from experience to
substitute for aggressive legal intervention. Indeed, some have claimed that
the SEC' s recent failures- including Madoff- are at least partly the product
of a government-wide anti-regulatory philosophy over the last decade or
SO.18 One criticized example, relevant to Madoff, is the belief that sophisticated, wealthy investors can fend for themselves and don't need the SEC's
38.

See Poser, supra note 4, at 317-19.
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belp. Such a belief, of course, might explain the SEC's relative disinterest
in Markopolos's tip.
It is not clear, however, that there was ever any strong ideological opposition to serious antifraud enforcement with respect to cases like MadotrS. 19 The Commission has brought a number of enforcement actions
where the wealthy were victimized, including some involving institutional
investors as victims. What is likely, however, is that in doing triage, the
Commission does place a higher value on cases targeting retail investors,
and assigns those against the wealthy a somewhat lower priority-----once
again, a resource-based account.
My sense is that the relative poverty of the SEC goes back much longer than the last decade,40 and reflects something more engrained in the political process. Congress maintains increasingly tight control over SEC policy
largely tluough the budgetary process, and having the Commission be habitually needy and under-resourced fits well within this strategy. The cam39. I do think, however, that such beliefs can have an effect on internal morale and
motivation, which in tum influences all behaviors. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1624.
There was a troubling disagreement between the commissioners and the enforcement staff
about pre-approvals for settlements, which has since been resolved. But this apparently grew
out of concern that the staff was too aggressive in one area- massive fines against companies, as opposed to sanctions against individual wrongdoers. The commissioners' concern
was that these fines essentially penalize the issuer's shareholders, who arc supposed to be the
beneficiaries of the SEC's work. Without getting into this difficult subject area, which I
have written about at length elsewhere (see Donald C. Langevoon, 011 Leaving Corporale
Executives "Naked. Homeless and Wi/haUl Wheels"; Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies,
and /he Debale Over Enlity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627
(2007», I think there is substance to that concern, though Cox overreacted in terms of
process and thereby sem an unfortunate signal of mistrust. The statT's inclination that close
cases with a well-publicized sanction can too often lead to shifting responsibility away from
the individuals who bear the most blame-insiders are happy to approve a settlement when
little or nothing comes out of their own pockets-and placing the burden on shareholders.
But this unfortunate intramural squabble was about policy, not ideology. This aside, the
SEC's enforcement program changed very lillie from the 1990's to the present in tenns of
types of cases brought or the allocation of investigatory resources, and Cox's enforcement
director, Linda Chatman Thomsen, was an able veleran of prior administrations.
40. A troubling-perhaps embellished-account by the founder of the Stratton
Oakmont brokerage finn tells how he and his lawyer (Ira Sorkin, who also happened to be
MadotT's lawyer) easily outmaneuvered the SEC, which is portrayed as somewhat bumbling
and overly cautious. This occurred in the mid-1990s. See JORDAN BElFORT, THE WOLF OF
WALl.. STREET 227-35 (2007). Belfort quotes Sorkin as doubling the Commissioo's will 10
pursue a tough case as far as they should, and Sorkin supposedly offers career-based reasons
for their excessive caution. Id But it is mainly reputational fear about bringing a case and
losing it. If we go back another decade---co the Reagan and first Bush Administrations, we
see substantial praise for the aggressiveness of the Enforcement Division, at least as applied
to its pursuit of insider lradiog on Wall Street. See generally D A VID A. VISE& STEVE COll,
EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991). Of course, these "oon-fictioo" accounls may well miss deeper
truths. The insider lrading campaign in the mid-1980s targeted high-profile Wall Street
players, for example, but ones who also had many enemies in the business community.
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paign contributions from various sources with an interest in securities regulation are large, and influential members of Congress hardly maximize their
own political advantage by stepping aside and leaving the SEC free to do its
work as it sees fit. Maybe there was more freedom decades ago, when
powerful legislators defended the SEC because its work mirrored what they
and their constituents wanted fairly closely. Today, however, that populist
legacy has disappeared, and Congress wants implicit control over the key
issues. The SEC suffers when it gets out of line.
That explains a great deal. If we assume that corporate issuers and the
financial services industry together wield the most clout, a relatively impoverished SEC inspection and enforcement program is a likely equilibrium
outcome. Not so impoverished tbat it becomes entirely meaningless, because that is not in the business community's interest. Fraud not only hurts
investor victims, but competitors as well. Moreover, investors will shy
away from investing when there is the perception that no one is looking
after their interests.
But the desired political equilibrium is one where the SEC doesn't
have the luxury of deep surveillance into the financial world either, and has
to tread cautiously before undertaking any major battles. That is precisely
what we have. And the result is that cases like Madoff can recur, for all the
reasons suggested earlier. It is not because Wall Street wants to protect
someone like Bernie Madoff, but because the abundance of tools and resources that might make that more likely to happen can too easily be put to
use to threaten more sensitive interests.
Harry Markopolos and many other SEC critics have compared the
Commission's failures to the successes of the Attorney General's offices in
New York and Massachusetts, to show what a good enforcement shop
should look like. Without going into a detailed comparison (and putting
aside that New York didn't stop Madoffeither), note two crucial differences. One is that, unlike the SEC, these state authorities have criminal sanctions at hand, which is particularly important given the collateral consequences for a securities finn of either indictment or conviction. even of a
misdemeanor. That threat gives state Attorneys General much greater bargaining power. Though some at the SEC have wished otherwise, Congress
has carefully limited the SEC to civil enforcement. Second, these Attorneys
General are elected officials with independent power bases and political
ambitions that are advanced by high-profile actions. They do not work for
their legislatures in the same way the SEC works for Congress. Without
altering the subservient political structure of the relationship between the
SEC and Congress-which will not happen- the comparison is fruitless. 41
41. For a more critical perspective, see Jonathan R. Macey. Wall Street in Tunnoil:
Slate-Federal Relations Past-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 117 (2004).
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CONCLUSION

The SEC's failure to catch Bernie MadofTis a sad and important slory,
but not one easily told. Images of an agency either riddled by ineptitude or
acting as Wall Street's captive enabler don't describe the much more complicated reality. Neither, however, is the SEC's self-conception as the investors' champion~fed by the ample amount of good work that it does
accomplish every day-which too easily blinds believers to all the other
work that could be done but is not, and all the troubling places in OUf securities markets that still operate in the dark.42
Meghan Cheung and the others at the SEC should have thought deeper
and harder about the risk Harry Markopolos described~with the benefit of
hindsight, they admit as much. But the institutional setting in which they
work, with demands that far exceed either capacity or resources and a resulting culture that rewards taking paths of least resistance, makes it likely
that many of us would probably have done the same thing.4l Working under
burnout conditions that make it impossible to do as well as one wants (or
the outside world expects) is demoralizing. The SEC is a proud old agency
with enough myths and internal routines to deflect some of that doubt, but
the result is still too many staff-level decisions that give in to the limits of
the job. The task is to imagine the counterfactual ideal of securities regulation done with adequate resources, knowledge, and political independence. 44
The deeper story about the SEC and Bernie Madoff, far too complicated to
be a compelling popular narrative, is why we are where we are rather than
in that much better regulatory world.

42. See umgevoort, supra note 26, at 1611-12. Perhaps this is a fonn of "d«p
capture." Cf 10n Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction 10 Ihe Situalional
Characler, Critical Realism, Pawer Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129
(2003) (describing the cognitive component of deep capture). For a claim of deep capture by
financial elites, see Simon Johnson, The Quiel Coup, ATLANTtC MONTHLY, May 2009, at 46.
43. Cheung and others involved were clear in expressing fruSlfation with the poor
resources and excessive demands of their jobs. See OIG REPORT, supra note 2, al ]64-66.
44. To be sure, this would not necessarily be an ideal world, if the addilional resources were turned into regulatory excess.

HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 914 2009

